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Electric utilities are directly affected by, and in some cases are a source of, many
pressing climate adaptation challenges: wildfires, vulnerable infrastructure, extreme
storms, and drought. The state Public Utilities Commission (PUC) is one of the most
consequential government agencies guiding the electricity sector’s response to climate
change. Rate-regulated utilities may not charge ratepayers for new capital investments
without PUC approval. When PUCs decide which costs are eligible for rate recovery, they
also define which risks utilities seek to manage and which hedging strategies they use to
do so. This Article argues that the foundational principles of ratemaking allow the state
PUC to manage many aspects of electricity sector adaptation planning, coordination, and
implementation. The Article begins with an overview of ratemaking for electric utilities and
identifies how the process is an exercise in risk management. The Article then explains
how a risk governance perspective can position the PUC to explicitly incorporate climate
adaptation into ratemaking procedures as well as help coordinate adaptation policy
across multiple agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
Electric utilities are directly affected by, and in some cases are the source of, many of society’s
most pressing climate adaptation challenges: wildfires, vulnerable infrastructure, extreme storms,
extreme temperatures, and drought. In most states, ratemaking decisions by the Public Utilities
Commission (PUC) directly influence how electric utilities respond. Investor-owned utilities serve
almost three quarters of U.S. electricity customers (U.S. Energy Info. Admin, 2019a). These
rate-regulated utilities may not charge ratepayers for new capital investments without PUC
approval. When PUCs decide which costs are eligible for rate recovery, they also define which risks
utilities seek to manage and which hedging strategies they use to do so.
This Article argues that the foundational principles of ratemaking allow the state PUC to
manage many aspects of electricity sector adaptation planning, coordination, and implementation.
Ratemaking includes many of the characteristics of effective climate adaptation governance: flexible
statutory authority for agencies overseeing critical sectors of the economy, the ability to collect and
respond to new information, and the ability to direct capital to ensure delivery of essential services.
The manner in which PUCs exercise their authority will determine how utilities prepare for, and
respond to, a changing climate.
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sufficient to compensate investors and attract capital for
future needs (Swanson Katz and Schneider, 2020). In some
states, PUCs use a similar process to evaluate utilities’
integrated resource plans that assess future generation
needs and investment options (Wilson and Biewald, 2013).
In between formal rate cases, PUCs hold proceedings
to consider such issues as whether capital expenditures
are prudent and thus eligible for a rate of return for
utility shareholders, whether to adjust allowable fuel
charges, and whether to approve rate increases due to new
regulatory requirements.
Balancing the multiple goals of ratemaking is an exercise in
mitigating and allocating risk. The process mitigates financial
risk to investors by protecting utilities from competition
and providing a high degree of certainty regarding returns.
Ratemaking mitigates financial risk to ratepayers by preventing
the utility from using its market power to drive up costs and
by controlling which costs monopoly utilities may pass on to
customers. Allowing the utility to earn a competitive rate of
return for shareholders and allowing it to charge customers for
capital investments helps mitigate reliability risk by facilitating
system planning and infrastructure investments.
The process also allocates risks among utilities, ratepayers,
and society. Ratepayers are often responsible for compensating
utilities for their investments even if the investment becomes
uneconomic before it is fully amortized (Webb et al., 2020). This
provides a high degree of certainty for investors and lenders,
helping the utility raise capital and keep borrowing costs low,
but it does not remove the risk altogether. In exchange for
the investor certainty and low borrowing costs, ratepayers bear
much of the financial risk once a PUC incorporates a capital
expenditure into utility’s rate base, insulating the utility from
changing market conditions. Similarly, ensuring that a utility may
pass reasonable fuel costs to ratepayers helps insulate the utility
from price fluctuations but may expose ratepayers to those same
risks. A PUC’s focus on low-cost investments may also prioritize
generation options with greater public health and environmental
impacts, thus keeping electricity rates lower but shifting costs and
burdens elsewhere in the economy1 .

The Article begins with an overview of ratemaking for
electric utilities and identifies how the process is an exercise
in risk management. The PUC pursues the traditional goals of
affordable rates, reliable service, and financial viability for the
utility by mitigating certain risks financial and technical risks,
and allocating a broader range of risks among utilities, ratepayers,
and society. The Article then explains how a risk governance
perspective can position the PUC to explicitly incorporate
climate adaptation into ratemaking procedures as well as help
coordinate adaptation policy across multiple agencies.

RATEMAKING AND RISK MANAGEMENT
The electricity sector’s climate adaptation challenges have been in
sharp relief in recent years. Catastrophic wildfires have caused
severe damage in western states, some of which were ignited
by electricity infrastructure. Utilities along the Gulf Coast and
East Coast have faced strong hurricanes and historic floods in
recent years. In the first half of 2021 alone, record-breaking heat
led to rolling blackouts in the Pacific Northwest, a severe winter
storm caused widespread power outages in Texas and pushed the
state’s grid to within minutes of total failure, a megadrought in
California threatened hydropower resources and increased the
risk of another catastrophic wildfire season, and the Atlantic
hurricane season was off to another early start (Cappucci, 2021;
Douglas, 2021; ERCOT, 2021; Patel, 2021; Singh, 2021). These are
immediate operational threats for the nation’s complex electricity
system, and highlight the direct link between electricity decisionmaking and the economic and social risks presented by a
changing climate. Ratemaking by state PUCs will play a pivotal
role guiding utilities’ responses.
Ratemaking reflects a century-old compromise. States grant
electric utilities exclusive licenses to sell electricity to retail
customers within their respective service territories. In exchange,
the PUC ensures that a monopoly utility’s rates are reasonable
and utility investments produce tangible benefits for ratepayers.
Rates must also allow a utility the opportunity to earn a
reasonable return on investments and attract capital to meet
future electricity demand (Bluefield Water Works, 1923).
State laws generally require that electricity rates be “just
and reasonable,” that utilities choose the least cost option
for providing reliable electricity, and that utilities may only
recover costs that are prudently incurred (Cal. PUC). PUCs have
broad discretion when applying these principles. Historically,
commissions apply the concepts narrowly, focusing on fuel costs,
available technologies, and changing electricity demand due to
population growth, but ignoring other factors with direct impacts
on costs and reliability. For example, least cost can depend upon
the time horizon under consideration, as regulatory changes
can increase costs significantly, but commissions are typically
reluctant to approve higher costs to mitigate regulatory risk
(Monast, 2015).
PUCs set rates through quasi-judicial processes, hearing
evidence about a utility’s costs presented by parties and
seeking a balance that ensures reliable service, keeps rates
affordable, and allows utilities to earn reasonable returns
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RATEMAKING’S ADAPTATION
GOVERNANCE POTENTIAL
Embracing the risk governance role of the PUC is the key to
facilitating a more comprehensive response to climate change.
The traditional approach to risk and ratemaking evolved
based on predictable weather patterns, stable electricity demand
growth, and a limited set of choices for generating electricity.
Recurring threats to infrastructure caused by droughts, fires,
storms, and extreme temperature swings have direct impacts
on system reliability and rates. Viewed in this light, climate
adaptation risks are similar to the risks typically addressed
through the ratemaking process. The PUC’s flexible statutory
1 For a more thorough discussion of the risk allocation, risk mitigation, and risk
creation roles of ratemaking, see Monast (2021). Precautionary Ratemaking. UCLA
Law Review 69: in press (http://ssrn.com/abstract=3898844).
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Furthermore, a case-by-case, or disaster-by-disaster, approach
may also fail to consider near-term responses in the context
of other policy and technology changes that may also
increase costs. Climate change is only one of the factors
complicating electricity sector planning. Utilities and regulators
are navigating changes in energy economics and technologies.
Older coal and nuclear plants are retiring, the pace of
electric vehicle adoption is uncertain, and advances in storage
technologies could fundamentally change the role of renewable
energy (Diaz, 2021). More states are also adopting aggressive
decarbonization goals, which will require resources and will
affect the price of electricity (U.S. Energy Info. Admin, 2019b).
A broader risk management view of ratemaking can seek
to optimize adaptation-focused investments with these other
changes affecting electricity grids.
Some PUCs take a more comprehensive approach to climaterelated risk assessment. The California PUC, for example,
requires the state’s investor-owned utilities to conduct regular
vulnerability assessments of their infrastructure, operations, and
services, as well as the communities they serve (California
PUC, 2020a,b). However, these broader PUC-directed risk
assessments are also inherently limited3 . Many of the risk
drivers are beyond the reach of the PUC and balancing
risk tradeoffs often requires a wider range of expertise and
resources than are typically found at PUCs or the utilities
they oversee.
Nonetheless, PUCs can contribute to adaptation governance
even where they do not have direct authority. Climate
adaptation requires weighing the longer-term solutions within
the direct control of the electricity sector, as well as balancing
the cost of these adaptation measures with the broader
needs of the electricity sector and society. There is no
single federal or state regulator that considers electricity
sector risks and tradeoffs in a comprehensive manner. The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission focuses on interstate
electricity markets and infrastructure. Regional transmission
organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs)
manage wholesale electricity markets in many states. State
and federal environmental regulators focus on public health
and environmental impacts. Local planning authorities may
oversee aspects of infrastructure siting and safety, but their
authority may be limited by geography or the scope of
their jurisdiction.
PUCs can help fill the gap by requiring utilities to expand
the scope of their integrated resource plans and vulnerability
assessments. These are recurring risk assessments that can
inform climate adaptation planning across multiple agencies.
Broader risk assessment can change the financial calculus
for some investments. They can also examine the adaptation
benefits of different grid options, as well as the economic
and social impacts if the electricity system fails to mitigate
certain risks and how those impacts may be borne in other
ways. The PUC could use these processes to assess risks

authority allow it to consider whether, and how, to mitigate and
allocate risks created by these emerging threats.
The multiyear drought in the western U.S. in an informative
case study in climate risk and PUC authority. The increasing
population living near wildland vegetation make wildfires more
likely, more deadly, and more expensive (Radeloff et al.,
2018). Existing power lines through a dry forest heightens the
likelihood of fire even if the utility performs regular maintenance
and vegetation management along rights-of-way. Depowering
transmission lines helps protect the public during periods of
extreme risk, but recurring power shutoffs are a drastic shift
for the utility’s obligation to provide reliable power and creates
additional public safety risks2 . Other options, such as shifting
to a more distributed electricity grid that does not rely upon
vulnerable transmission lines or burying power lines in highrisk areas, can mitigate reliability and public safety risk but
may be cost prohibitive. Further complicating matters, risk
mitigation by electric utilities cannot eliminate other sources of
wildfire risk (Baker, 2017). Lightning strikes and human activities
such as campfires, burning brush, and fireworks can also cause
devastating fires.
Prioritizing long-term risk mitigation rather than low
electricity rates in the near-term can expand the types of
investments appropriately included in electricity rates, allowing
consideration of more costly investments to hedge against the
potential for widespread infrastructure damage or threats to
public safety. A risk governance approach can also determine
which risks to mitigate, which to address outside the ratemaking
context, and which to accept.
PUCs already engage in adaptation-related risk management
to varying degrees, but they may not refer to it as such.
For example, PUCs approve costs for storm preparation and
recovery, and many states authorize investments to redesign
infrastructure in areas prone to hurricanes and floods (U.S. Dept.
of Energy, 2010). Enhanced vegetation management to reduce
fire risk and winterizing power plants in areas that have not
historically been vulnerable to severe cold spells help increase
resiliency to extreme weather events.
There are important limitations with a case-by-case
approach to extreme weather, fires, and other natural
disasters. Focusing on immediate needs may continue path
dependency based on existing system design, locking in
infrastructure costs and overlooking higher cost options
with greater risk mitigation potential. For example,
improved vegetation management may help reduce the
chance that transmission lines will spark wildfires, but
a more decentralized system with less dependence on
transmission lines through fire prone areas may have
greater risk reduction benefits and enhance reliability during
wildfire season.

2 For example, power shutoffs by PG&E in 2019 affected millions of customers and
provided little warning (MacMillan and Siddiqui, 2019). Residents who depend on
electricity to operate oxygen machines and other life-saving electronics had limited
time to relocate or buy generators (Chabria and Luna, 2019). The power outage also
caused 874 cell towers to shut down, creating additional public safety risks (CBS SF
Bay Area, 2020).
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3 Ziaja, S., and Chhabra, M. (2021). Climate Adaption for Energy Utilities: Lessons
Learned from California’s Pioneering Regulatory Actions (article to be published as
part of the Frontiers in Climate, Coordinating Climate Adaptation collection).
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may earn, and the expenses that qualify for the rate-ofreturn. Whether or not PUCs characterize their ratemaking
decisions as adaptation policy, their actions dictate how utilities
prepare for, and respond to, a changing climate. Most state
PUCs approach climate risk using a narrow economic lens,
focusing on near-term threats that could have direct impacts
on electricity rates, system reliability, or the financial viability
of the utility. This is not the formula to adapt to climate
change while also maintaining an affordable and reliable
electricity grid. Recognizing the link between climate risk and
the PUC’s traditional roles allows commissioners to take a
more comprehensive approach to the risks within their direct
jurisdiction and help facilitate adaptation responses across
multiple agencies.

beyond its immediate jurisdiction, particularly if those risks
have implications for electric utilities and their customers. The
PUC, or another designated state agency, could then use the
risk assessments to develop multi-agency responses and identify
policy priorities.
A PUC-led approach to climate adaptation governance is
not a substitute for new state and federal policies designed
explicitly to address climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Effective multi-agency coordination would presumably
require additional resources for the risk assessments and
ideally would not rely on utilities conduct the assessments
themselves. However, in the absence of new policies and
government funding, the PUC is an agency that is already
making decisions about climate adaptation. Recognizing
the PUC’s risk governance role would help explicitly
incorporate the electricity sector’s adaptation needs into
the ratemaking process.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The original contributions presented in the study are included
in the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can be
directed to the corresponding author.

CONCLUSION
The state PUC is one of the most consequential government
agencies guiding a utility’s investments, and thus a state’s energy
mix. The PUC decides which costs a utility may recover
from its customers, the rate-of-return a utility’s shareholders
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